Free Essays on The Jungle

The Jungle Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle is the story of a Lithuanian family that immigrates from their home city in Lithuania to the city of Chicago. The novel begins with the strong description of a wedding in which Ona Lukoszaite and Jurgis Rudkus are united in Holy Matrimony. The two of them then move to Chicago, to live their American dream. Soon after the wedding, Ona and Jurgis have many great debts to pay due to both the wedding, and a large debt that Ona’s father left them after he died. Due to Jurgis’s large size and strong will he found a job in Chicago within only a half an hour of waiting in the unemployment line. Back in the newlywed’s hometown of Lithuania, Ona and Jurgis’ family anticipated a move to America. America uses the image of the â€Å"American Dream† to lure immigrants to this land of opportunity. The family desperately desires higher wages and true freedom. For months and months, Jurgis works very hard to pay for the families travel to Ona and Jurgis’ new hometown, Chicago. When the family finally makes it to America, their funds are very low. They met with a well off man named Jokubas Szedvilas who placed the family in a run down youth hostel. Jokubas takes the family to the meatpacking factory. He makes jokes about the sanitation of the operation (due only to the lack of quality of the meat). The family finds an advertisement for a housing complex that is very cheap. They talk to a real estate agent and they go see the housing complex. The houses aren’t as big and luxurious as they are pictured in the advertisement, but the price is right. The real estate agent swindles them, and they are pulled into the contract. Sinclair emphasizes the corruption of upper class society during this era. Jurgis’s father, Dede Antanas, is promised a job by a grubby worker, but only if he pays that worker one third of his wages. He takes the job despite the disgusting working co... Free Essays on The Jungle Free Essays on The Jungle The Jungle Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle is the story of a Lithuanian family that immigrates from their home city in Lithuania to the city of Chicago. The novel begins with the strong description of a wedding in which Ona Lukoszaite and Jurgis Rudkus are united in Holy Matrimony. The two of them then move to Chicago, to live their American dream. Soon after the wedding, Ona and Jurgis have many great debts to pay due to both the wedding, and a large debt that Ona’s father left them after he died. Due to Jurgis’s large size and strong will he found a job in Chicago within only a half an hour of waiting in the unemployment line. Back in the newlywed’s hometown of Lithuania, Ona and Jurgis’ family anticipated a move to America. America uses the image of the â€Å"American Dream† to lure immigrants to this land of opportunity. The family desperately desires higher wages and true freedom. For months and months, Jurgis works very hard to pay for the families travel to Ona and Jurgis’ new hometown, Chicago. When the family finally makes it to America, their funds are very low. They met with a well off man named Jokubas Szedvilas who placed the family in a run down youth hostel. Jokubas takes the family to the meatpacking factory. He makes jokes about the sanitation of the operation (due only to the lack of quality of the meat). The family finds an advertisement for a housing complex that is very cheap. They talk to a real estate agent and they go see the housing complex. The houses aren’t as big and luxurious as they are pictured in the advertisement, but the price is right. The real estate agent swindles them, and they are pulled into the contract. Sinclair emphasizes the corruption of upper class society during this era. Jurgis’s father, Dede Antanas, is promised a job by a grubby worker, but only if he pays that worker one third of his wages. He takes the job despite the disgusting working co...

Search Draft Registration Records (Cards) From WWII

Search Draft Registration Records (Cards) From WWII Millions of men living in America completed draft registration cards between 1940 and 1943 as part of the WWII draft. The majority of these draft cards are not yet open to the public for privacy reasons, but almost 6 million WWII draft cards completed during the fourth registration by men between the ages of 42 and 64 in 1942 are open to the public  for research. This registration, known as the Old Mans Draft, provides a great deal of information on the men who participated, including their full name, address, physical characteristics, and date and place of birth. Note: Ancestry.com has started to make World War II draft cards from the 1-3 registrations, and 5-6 registrations available online in a new database U.S. WWII Draft Cards Young Men, 1898-1929. As of  July 2014, the database  includes registrations filled out by men in Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, and North Carolina. Record Type:  Draft registration cards, original records (microfilm and digital copies also available) Location:  U.S., although some individuals of foreign birth are also included. Time Period:  1940–1943 Best For:  Learning the exact date of birth and place of birth for all registrants. This can be especially useful for research of foreign-born men who never became naturalized U.S. citizens. It also provides a source for tracking individuals after the 1930 U.S. census. What is a WWII Draft Registration Record? On May 18, 1917, the Selective Service Act authorized the President to temporarily increase the U.S. military. Under the office of the Provost Marshal General, the Selective Service System was established to draft men into military service. Local boards were created for each county or similar state subdivision, and for every 30,000 people in cities and counties with a population greater than 30,000. During World War II there were seven draft registrations: October 16, 1940 - all men 21-31 years residing in the U.S. - whether native born, naturalized, or alienJuly 1, 1941 - men who reached age 21 since the first registrationFebruary 16, 1942 - men 20-21 and 35-44 years of ageApril 27, 1942 - Men 45-64 years of age. Not liable for military service. *Only draft cards open to publicJune 30, 1942 - Men 18-20 years of ageDecember 10-31, 1942 - Men who reached the age of 18 since the previous registrationNovember 16 - December 31, 1943 - American men living abroad, aged 18-44 What You Can Learn From WWII Draft Records: Keep in mind that WWII Draft Registration Records are not military service records - they dont document anything past the individuals arrival at training camp and contain no information about an individuals military service. It is also important to note that not all of the men who registered for the draft actually served in the military, and not all men who served in the military registered for the draft. How to Search the WWII Draft Registration Records If youre searching online and dont know where your individual was living, you can sometimes find him through other identifying factors. Many individuals registered by their full name, including middle name, so you might try searching for a variety of name variations. You could also narrow the search by month, day and/or year of birth.

A Linear Programming Math Problem Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

A Linear Programming - Math Problem Example In mathematics, linear programming (LP) problems involve the optimization of a linear objective function (i.e., maximize profit or minimize cost) subject to linear equality and inequality contraints. {"Linear Programming." Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia}. Since the problem involves a production and distribution system, use of the Transportation Method in Linear Programming is the best way to solve this. {Heizer, Jay and Render, Render. "Production and Operations Management". pp. 373-399}. A dummy destination is required since the production capacity is greater than the demand. {Heizer, Jay and Render, Render. "Production and Operations Management". p381} .. FromTo Ashmum Branford Crackers Cookies Chips Crackers Cookies Chips Milford 20 50 30 Guilford 30 25 20 This recommendation will enable the company to minimize total operating cost at US$ 3,195,000 per month whilst efficiently supplying the requirement of each outlet. List of Cited Works {Heizer, Jay and Render, Render. "Production and Operations Management".4th Edition.p.240} {Heizer, Jay and Render, Render. "Production and Operations Management".4th Edition. Chapter 9. pp. 373-399} {Heizer, Jay and Render, Render. "Production and Operations Management".4th Edition. Chapter 9. p381} {"Linear Programming." Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia}.

The Short Story Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1500 words

The Short Story - Essay Example This story utilizes a great deal of symbolism to tell the story of divine justice and retribution. Much of the action takes place under the Juniper Tree, which was typically associated in folklore with witches and the unnatural things they could do with their magic. This is reinforced by the blood sacrifice, however accidental, of the first wife and her surety of having a child as well as by her foreknowledge of her own death. Other instances of witchcraft occurring under the tree include the young daughter’s placement of the bones under the tree and the transformation of the bones into the beautiful bird that is then able to act on his own. It also uses the Biblical symbolisms of the Evil One, who continuously influences the second wife to do evil to the young son and the form of the apple. The second wife uses the apple to tempt the young son to the trunk with the sharp lock on it that functions to behead him and an apple is used to entice the daughter to strike her brother, causing her to feel his death is her fault. Although it is a story of retribution, the husband and the daughter suffer no ill effects because their participation in the boy’s murder were unintentional, unlike the second wife’s deliberate entrapment and murder. The husband was not aware that the boy’s body had been cut into the stew he ate and the daughter realistically played no part in the murder yet suffered a great deal of grief over his loss. Therefore, the husband received a golden necklace, to remind him to always be mindful of what he swallows while the daughter received a pair of apple red shoes to remind her to always watch her steps. Like the Grimm’s Brothers â€Å"Juniper Tree†, Edgar Allen Poe’s story â€Å"The Black Cat† deals with the concept of retribution or justice. In this story, the main character has a fondness for a cat that gradually turns to hatred as the man is overtaken by alcoholism. He first cuts out an eye of the cat and then hangs him.

Role of Women Essay Example for Free

Role of Women Essay In this essay I will investigate what the role status was of women in Britain in the late 1940’s 50’s. I will examine the lives of women in Britain before World War II, during the war, instantly after and in the period of 1950’s to analyse if the roles and status of women altered during these periods in what manner and why. Overall I would conclude by evaluating if womens independence increased or whether it remained limited by the period 1950’s. Before the World War II the roles of women in Britain was to be Housewifes and mothers they had to take care of the family and the house, this was tradition and they had to follow it if any women who wouldn’t do this was seen as extraordinary.During this period there was a lot prejudice and discrimination towards women however in the same society men were seen as the more powerful gender. The men worked and brought the money the women didn’t so their status was seen as low there job was to looking after the future of the nation the children. During the war there were critical changes in the roles and status of women, the government need the women to keep the country running and also helping the war effort by taking jobs in artillery factories, ammunition production, wardens etc. The women were working in jobs which were once seen as only for men due to their physical strength however in this period women demonstrated that they could take such jobs on. Although women started to work and had new roles they did however fulfil their prior roles as Housewifes mothers taking on more than one role which they didn’t have an opportunity to do before the war. The status of women throughout this period increased due to them the country was still running and they were helping the war effort dearly, however they weren’t still seen as equal to men in status and were considered as second to men. The women were just substitutes for work until the men would return from war. In this period some women weren’t shown equality due to not receiving equal pay as men, when women school teachers asked for equal pay as men teachers, Churchill dismissed their demands with one word, â€Å"impertinence.† These women weren’t successful however some women at a Rolls Royce factory went on strike for a week for equal pay and eventually got it, this shows some women at this period were victorious in getting equal pay but not all women got equal pay. Instantly after the war men were demobilized and sent back home from the war this impacted women extremely since the independence they had during the war would no longer exist. The women were instructed to go back home and fulfil their previous roles which they had before the war and the men would return to the jobs. Many women however better suited some jobs than men but weren’t kept after the war only because they were women they were told that their priories should be at home. This can be seen when a deputy newspaper editor was told she was dismissed, â€Å"Oh it’s nothing wrong with your work, but we have to safeguard the succession and the successor had to be a man.† The status of women during this period was shown as higher since the women had a very important duty which was to look after the nation by bringing up the children. In the period of 1950’s some women wanted to carry on working work but were allowed part time jobs which could be easily dismissed, many women were told that they should look after the homes working wasn’t there roles such women who wanted to work were seen as unusual by the society of Britain. In the advertisement published by the government which said â€Å"Your after-the-ware dream is coming true. Now yours will be the responsibility of looking after the nation’s health† clarifies the point. The Beveridge report recommended a welfare state for the nation which was introduced by the government this benefited women economically, politically and socially this meant women no longer needed to depend on the men. The welfare state launched the National heath services which promised to provide health care for everybody this was the first time women were covered in health, furthermore it paid family allowance directly to the women this gave women more independence and money of there own which they could use on their desire. The affluence increased in the 1950’s due to the welfare state, this changed the lives of the women since they could purchase labour saving appliances which gave them more time and independence from the home they no longer needed to spend a whole exhausting day washing the cloths. To conclude, I belive that women gained more independence in the period of the 1950`s exceeding from just being house wife’s and mothers. The Beverigde report and the welfare sate transformed womens life giving them importance and care, furthermore the increased affluence also provided women with labour saving appliances and increase in independence. Although these changes had been made they did not completely change womens independence it was still limited in various ways one of the ways was women were only allowed part time jobs. The roles of women in theses period was to be housewife’s and mothers though economical, social and political changes brought increase in independence however, it can also be seen as not equal to men and limited.

Religion and Politics Essay examples -- Papers Church State Separation

Religion and Politics Both liberals and conservatives have become quite adept at mixing religion and politics in our current society. One also continues to observe an ongoing practice of civil religion demonstrated by presidents and office-seekers on both the left and right. Generally, the leftist merger of religion and politics has received greater social acceptability because it has been cloaked in such rights' causes as civil rights, women's rights, or economic rights (the social distribution of wealth). The advocating of these rights issues have provided an appearance of transcending religion, keeping the left relatively free from criticism of any church and state overlap. Christian Conservatives, however, have found it more difficult to reasonably combine faith and politics because they have more overtly recognized that their political positions are grounded on faith assumptions. This has resulted in numerous attacks by both non-Christians and Christians alike against the conservative attempt to merge religion and politics. Three arguments have been used most frequently against the conservative mixture of religion and politics. In what follows each of these arguments is stated and then refuted. The first argument is that politics is too worldly. The essence of the argument is that politics is part of this world's system, and Christ clearly taught His followers to "love not the world," and to flee from worldly activities. There is a danger of becoming caught up in th... ...hermore, in the Bible there is much political activity by God's servants. The judges and kings ruled under God. The prophets and Moses were quite political. Daniel served in the civil governments of Babylon and Persia. Joseph governed in Egypt. The Apostles spoke of following God's rules rather than men's. In conclusion, to be obedient to Christ requires political activity. Jesus is quite clear about the need to overcome social injustices. If Christ tells us to confront the forces of evil, but society tells us not to, and even makes a law against bringing religion into politics, then who should we follow, the state or Christ? In the broadest sense, we are called to political activity because we are responsible to apply Christian principles and standards to all areas of our society, and politics is one of these areas.

A Improving Your Math Skills Course Education Essay

IntroductionBettering Your Math Skills was offered over the period January 12th to March 6th ( 8 hebdomads ) to ease the new cohort pupils at the Open Campus January consumption. This was the 2nd offering of the class for pupils come ining the BSc Management programme across the Open Campus Country sites. Prior to summer 2008, this class was available to pupils at Trinidad and Tobago sites merely. As with the old offer of the class during summer 2008, the eight hebdomads of class bringing was site based with local face to face coachs supplying 6 hours of direction per hebdomad for a sum of 48 contact hours. Two student/course coordinator and two tutor/course coordinator audio conferences were besides conducted. The class coordinator, Mr. Roger Charles was responsible for posting on-line class updates and reacting to administrative questions and related inquiries in the Tutor/Student Exchange Forum. 118 pupils were registered for this offer of the class across 19 Open campus sites. The module adviser to the programme Mr. Martin Franklin of the Department of Economics, Faculty of Social Sciences, continued to supply support to the class coordinator as required. Course fees remained at the rate of US $ 180.00 per pupil for a entire income of US $ 21,240.00.Course AssessmentThe January/March offer of the class saw a alteration in one of the constituents of the in class appraisal, with an online graded quiz replacing the face to confront mid class scrutiny. The engagement grade for completion of hebdomadal online quizzes as the other constituent of coursework remained unchanged. The displacement to to the full online coursework constituents means that jobs associated with the reception of books and Markss sheets from the OC sites have been eliminated, and pupils were able to see their coursework Markss good in progress of the terminal of learning. The displacement besides realized some nest eggs for the Open Campus, as coachs will no longer be required to tag books as portion of the place duties, and the associated US $ 5.00/per book costs will no longer be incurred.Course MaterialsThe class stuff remained unchanged for this offer of the class. At present this consists of photocopied infusions from a assortment of beginnings in chapter format. The stuff is non unit based, larning aims are non stated and there are no worked illustrations to steer pupil activity in the class. Two transcripts of a recommended Pre concretion text per site were provided for pupil usage as portion of the class resources available at the several site locations. The overall cost for purchase of the recommended text, production and transportation of the class stuffs was about US $ 4,400.00 broken down as follows: Photocopying and transportation of 43 page brochure to 19 sites – US $ 3830.00 Purchase of recommended text – US $ 570.00Course CoachsMost of the face to face coachs were returning coachs, the exclusion being the coach at the Mona, Jamaica site. As stated antecedently, the coach support continued to be site based, with on-line interaction limited to that between the pupils and the class coordinator. No learning took topographic point online. During the old offer of the class, local coachs expressed concern over the deficiency of entree to the on-line constituents of the class ( hebdomadal online quiz for which a engagement grade is awarded ) , given that their pupils often requested explanations/clarification on some of the countries covered. The Learning Support Supervisor agreed to ease sing entree for coachs during the January/February offer, nevertheless the chance was non followed up by most of the coachs and the focal point of their attempts remained on face to confront interaction at the several local sites. In respect to wage, prior to the January/February offer, local coachs were paid at the hourly rate particulars to their sites, up to a upper limit of 48 hours. Ratess varied across the site locations runing from US $ 27 to US $ 37.50 per hr. The January/February offer saw the catching of coachs in conformity with the standardised agreements in topographic point for coach services, and debut of the level rate of US $ 950 for the period of battle. The level rate was reviewed during the period of class bringing in response to concerns expressed by some site coordinators on behalf of the coachs that the wage was unequal given the figure of hours of direction required. The Director APAD agreed to an extra payment of US $ 160, for a entire wage of US $ 1,110.00 per coach. The overall Open Campus cost for proviso of local coach support was US $ 15,540.00.REVIEW OF COURSE COORDINATOR ‘S REPORTSpecific facets of the class coordinator ‘s study ( see fond regard ) are discussed under specific headers below.Course Outcomes – Pass/Fail RatessOf the 118 pupils registered for the class, the concluding grade entries indicate that 61.6 % attained the base on balls grade of 50. In respect to the pass/fail rate for the class, four sites recorded hapless pupil public presentation with in surplus of 50 per centum of the pupils neglecting the class: Cave Hill ( 66 % ) , Mayaro ( 63 % ) , Mona ( 55 % ) and St Lucia ( 84 % ) . One pupil from each of the following sites attempted the class without local coach support and was non successful: Bahamas, BVI, Cayman Islands, Montego Bay and Montserrat. Note that these sites were advised prior to the start of learning that local coach support where the figure of pupils was little would non be cost effectual and those pupils should be encouraged to take the class in the summer. In seeking to explicate student public presentation on the concluding scrutiny the class coordinator ‘s study discussed the inability of â€Å" several of the pupils † to come to footings with some of the subjects in the programme. The subjects that presented some step of trouble were cited as Graphs, Logs and solutions of coincident equations. All three are cardinal countries of accent in ECON1003 – Mathematicss for Social Sciences, the Level 1 class for which Improving Your Math Skills is designed to function as academic readying. In reexamining the debatable countries originating from a reappraisal of the concluding scrutiny books, the Course Coordinator farther noted the followers: â€Å" Areas where pupils were most successful were sets and simple factorisation. Students seem to hold trouble negociating logs in peculiar. Too many pupils had jobs finding the right points for the graph and that was a direct consequence of them non being able to correctly utility values into the equation and being able to work out ( negociating directed Numberss ) . † A reappraisal of the class lineation indicates that the subjects showing the greatest trouble for pupils are those scheduled for bringing subsequently in the class. As a effect, there may non hold been sufficient clip to cover them at the degree of item required.Course DeliveryIn respect to class bringing the Course Coordinator ‘s study suggests three specific countries of concern, as follows: Teaching and Facilitation of Learning, in peculiar the local coach ‘s cognition and accomplishment in steering acquisition Instructional Design, in peculiar the relationship between the class aims, class activities, the instruction schemes, and usage of on-line resources Learning experience in relation to the scholar ‘s prerequisite cognition and the ability of the class to run into their demands. Teaching and Facilitation of Learning: During the lead up to the first offer of the class to the Open Campus Sites in summer 2008, Sites Heads were asked to enroll local coachs on counsel from the module adviser at St Augustine, Mr Martin Franklin. Selection standards included ownership of a first grade in Mathematics, a lower limit of 2 old ages learning experience in the capable country and a instructor ‘s sheepskin. However, run intoing the sheepskin standards proved hard and most of the coachs selected at the respective sites have met the grade and experience standards merely. This has deductions for the facilitation of teaching/learning. The class coordinator ‘s study high spots this in portion as follows: â€Å" . Some coachs may necessitate counsel in fixing their pupils for some of the more debatable subjects in the programme. † The cognition of the single local coachs however, the above statement points to the demand for managed coach support, proviso of enhanced class resources and clear guidelines on the instruction schemes to be employed. Instructional Design: As indicated antecedently, the stuffs for this class are non designed in a mode that speaks to specific larning aims and results. Local coachs were hence guided by the information provided by the class coordinator during the two teleconferencing Sessionss with them, the class lineation where the class purposes are stated and which lists the class subjects in sequence and other information provided by the class coordinator via electronic mail as the demand arises. The class purposes are listed in the class lineation as follows: Engage pupils in larning activities affecting cardinal cardinal constructs in Mathematicss. Improve pupils ‘ proficiency in Pre-Calculus Mathematicss. Build pupils ‘ assurance in Mathematics prior to reading ECON1003. Supply the basic tools needed to assist pupils appreciate and acknowledge the usage of appropriate basic mathematical constructs in a given job state of affairs. The mode in which these purposes are to be achieved is non instantly clear since these purposes are non tied to specific larning aims and declared class activities. The learning schemes to be employed are non stated. This renders monitoring by the class coordinator or class bringing support, hard at best. The outlook that class bringing is happening in promotion of the class aims appears to be an country that will necessitate reexamine given the following infusion from the class coordinator ‘s study: â€Å" After reexamining several of the books it would look that many pupils in the assorted districts, were non able or prepared sufficiently to pull off with the more complex facets of the programmeaˆÂ ¦ † If the class is to function as academic readying for ECON1003, a demand is suggested for clear articulation of course/unit aims, development of related class activities and handiness of standard resources including tutorial sheets and solutions. Online resources besides need to be sourced to advance easiness of apprehension of subjects ; more so in those subjects which student public presentation indicates may be debatable. Learning Experience: The module at St Augustine recommended that all appliers to the BSc Management programme who passed O ‘ Level Mathematics over five old ages ago, or who have taken O ‘ Level Mathematicss at the secondary degree, but did non achieve a passing class, be required to take this class. Students hence come to the class with different degrees of pre necessity cognition that would necessitate changing attacks to instruction in maintaining with their acquisition manners and ability to understand and retain the constructs taught. The full push of the class is remedial, which would besides necessitate specific attacks to instruction to run into the demands of weaker pupils. The extent to which this is evidenced in respect to the construction of the class stuffs or expressed instruction schemes and guidelines is non instantly evident. The class coordinator ‘s study speaks to the proficiency of the pupils and the likely impact on their learning experience. There is a suggestion for reappraisal of the period allocated for class bringing in relation to the deepness of coverage of the subjects. He notes the followers: â€Å" Several of the coachs indicated that because of the low degree proficiency amongst some of the pupils, they needed more clip to decently and adequately present the more hard facets of the programme. † The inquiry hence arises as to the adequateness of an eight hebdomad period of class bringing for coverage of the relevant subjects in the face to confront puting merely, given that the accent is on remedial work as a characteristic of the class design. Alternatively, the figure of subjects to be covered during the period and the deepness of coverage required, may be excessively ambitious given the mark audience and the varying abilities and anterior cognition pupils bring to the class. This poses jobs for bringing when all of the varying abilities are gathered in one schoolroom and the coach has to run into all of the demands in the limited clip available. The class rating instrument was non available at the terminal of instruction, therefore pupils taking the class were non able to measure the learning experience. Such information would hold served as a usher to countries of betterment. However, a reappraisal of the remarks posted by pupils in the Tutor Student Exchange Forum speaks to two facets of the acquisition experience that are informative. Remarks related to the quality of the class stuff and the instructional design are shown below. â€Å" The unit stuff was collected at the campusaˆÂ ¦.I was inquiring where is it that the stuff contains merely 2 chapters and the remainder of it is merely exercises.A I need some illustrations to follow for the last 2 quizzes and was unable to acquire much aid from the stuff given.A What other press release is at that place? A Had some jobs with indicies and powers. † â€Å" Mr Charles I ‘m at a lost hereaˆÂ ¦ I was give a transcript of a brochure with 43 pages which every bit far as Is can Tell does non truly explicate excessively muchaˆÂ ¦..I ‘m inquiring if there is any other class stuff that was given out to the other sites and non here. If so please allow me cognize. Will the cxc mathematics text work for this class? † While these pupil posters speak to the demand for a closer expression at the design of the class stuff supplied to pupils and the supports available, they besides provide limited penetration to the larning experience of pupils and suggest a demand for more contact with class teachers.RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTThe recommendations for betterment highlighted in the class coordinator ‘s study focal point on the followers: Improved resources to back up instruction and facilitate acquisition: Provision of worked illustrations and development of tutorial sheets to steer teaching/learning Monitoring of coach public presentation: Development of supervising systemsExpanded period for class bringingItems 1 and 2 are steps that can be accommodated as short term betterments to ease the following offer of the class ( at the clip of authorship, the bill of exchange register agenda lists the class day of the months as June 1st to July 27th 2009 ) . Item 3 may be considered as portion of a comprehensive reappraisal of the class content, class aims, the class stuffs and bringing manner. This will incur a cost to the Open Campus for the services of either an Instructional Designer or a substantial class author and the services of a Curriculum Development Specialist. For the short term, it is recommended that the following be considered in the context of Items 1 and 2 to ease readying for the summer offer and these enterprises be assessed at the terminal of the summer offering:Summer 2009 OfferImproved resources to back up instruction and facilitate acquisition: Worked illustrations are an indispensable usher to ease pattern. These illustrations should construct on the stuff contained in the recommended text and supply exposure to different combinations of the type of mathematical jobs that pupils are likely to meet as portion of their readying for ECON1003. In run intoing this demand the class coordinator should work with the Programme Coordinator to ease the resources required to back up instruction and acquisition: Designation of on-line resources ( Personal computer to work in coaction with Campus Librarian ) Preparation of tutorial sheets ( Course Coordinator ) Preparation of worked illustrations to supplement stuffs ( Course Coordinator ) Development of guidelines for coachs on countries for focal point in face to confront Sessionss ( Course Coordinator ) Consideration should be given to decrease of the accent on face to confront schoolroom direction and debut of online learning support to complement the direction provided in the schoolroom: Reduce face to confront schoolroom direction to 3 hours per hebdomad and supply clear coach guidelines for the countries of focal point. Emphasis should be placed on those subjects that the reappraisal of scrutiny books indicates as the most ambitious for pupils. Supply all face to face coachs with on-line entree to the online environment Introduce an Online Teaching Assistant to the class to help the class coordinator with facilitation of tutorial sheets, proviso of elaborate solutions at the terminal of each hebdomad and general feedback to pupils. A engagement grade should be awarded for each tutorial sheet entry from pupils Reappraisal of the 30 % coursework constituent to supply more pupil inducements for engagement in guided activities: Participation grade for completion hebdomadal online pattern quiz ( already a characteristic of the class – 7 Markss ) Participation grade for entry of tutorial sheet replies ( tutorial sheet to be available at the terminal of each hebdomad – recommended 8 Markss ) Graded online quiz ( component already included in class – decrease of the weighting required – recommended 15 Markss ) . These recommendations may be considered in the context of the bing scenarios shown in Appendix 1.

Ownership Structure, Managerial Behavior and Corporate Value

Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (2005) 645 – 660 www. elsevier. com/locate/econbase Ownership structure, managerial behavior and corporate value J. R. Daviesa, David Hillierb,T, Patrick McColganc a University of Strathclyde, UK b University of Leeds, UK c University of Aberdeen, UK Received 21 November 2002; accepted 6 July 2004 Available online 20 April 2005 Abstract The nonlinear relationship between corporate value and managerial ownership is well documented. This has been attributed to the onset of managerial entrenchment, which results in a decrease of corporate value for increasing levels of managerial holdings. We propose a new structure for this relationship that accounts for the effect of conflicting managerial incentives, and external and internal disciplinary monitoring mechanisms. Using this specification as the basis for our analysis, we provide evidence that the managerial ownership–corporate value relationship is co-deterministic. This finding is at odds with recent work which reports that corporate value determines managerial ownership but not vice-versa. D 2005 Elsevier B. V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: G32 Keywords: Ownership structure; Capital expenditure; Corporate value; Tobin’s Q 1. Introduction In a market without agency problems, corporate managers will choose investments that maximise the wealth of shareholders. In practice, competing objectives which are incompatible with the shareholder wealth-maximising paradigm may also be pursued. T Corresponding author. Leeds University Business School, University of Leeds, Maurice Keyworth Building Leeds, LS2 9JT, UK. Tel. : +44 113 3434359; fax: +44 113 3434459. E-mail address: d. j. [email  protected] c. uk (D. Hillier). 0929-1199/$ – see front matter D 2005 Elsevier B. V. All rights reserved. doi:10. 1016/j. jcorpfin. 2004. 07. 001 646 J. R. Davies et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (2005) 645–660 Following Jensen and Meckling (1976), a large literature has developed that examines how managerial behavior impacts upon firm performance. A vibrant strand of this literature concerns the relationship between managerial ownership levels, the direct investment decisions made by management and the inherent value of the firm, as proxied by Tobin’s Q ratio. Morck et al. 1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) provide evidence of a significant nonlinear relationship between corporate value and managerial ownership. Specifically, value increases with managerial holdings for low levels of ownership. At some level, managers become entrenched within the firm resulting in a decrease in firm value. However, whereas Morck et al. (1988) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) document further changes in the corporate value–managerial holdings relationship at high levels of equity ownership, McConnell and Servaes (1990) report no such change. Recent work has built upon the findings of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) who argue that levels of managerial ownership will be determined endogenously in equilibrium. Moreover, Cho (1998) and Himmelberg et al. (1999) have shed doubt upon the earlier findings of Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) by controlling for the effects of endogeneity and unobservable (to the econometrician) firm characteristics in their analysis. After controlling for the effects of endogeneity in the corporate value– managerial holdings relationship, they showed that managerial ownership had little or no effect on corporate value and investment. Short and Keasey (1999) and Faccio and Lasfer (1999) utilize a cubic specification to model the corporate value–managerial holdings relationship and both report a significant nonlinear functional form, similar to Morck et al. (1988), for British companies. However, neither study fully examines the misspecifying impact of endogeneity on their results. In this paper, we propose a new structure to the managerial ownership–corporate value relationship which captures a more complex characterisation of the evolving behavior of managers. We argue that at high levels of managerial ownership when external market discipline becomes neffective, there will be a resurgence of entrenchment behavior. With equity holdings around 50%, managers will have implicit control of their company, but still do not have objectives completely aligned to external shareholders. Only at very high levels of managerial holdings are incentives akin to other shareholders. When this model is applied to a l arge sample of firms incorporated in the UK, managerial ownership is seen to have a significant impact on corporate value. This relationship is endogenous, and consistent with Cho (1998) and Himmelberg et al. (1999), corporate value has a corresponding effect on managerial holdings. We also find that although ownership levels are affected by firm level investment, there is no evidence of the reverse occurring. In the next section we outline our model of the managerial ownership–corporate value relationship. We present empirical results in Section 3 and conclude in Section 4. 2. The model In this section, we propose an alternative structure to the managerial holdings–corporate value relationship and argue that the cubic, or simpler representations, used in earlier J. R. Davies et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (2005) 645–660 647 studies1 are unnecessarily restrictive and misspecified. The model that is presented here captures further nonlinearities in this relationship at high levels of managerial holdings and has a quintic specification. Management is faced with both negative and positive incentives to ensure that they follow objectives which maximise shareholder wealth. The effectiveness of these incentives is potentially a function of the level of managerial ownership in the firm. We view the propensity of management to maximise shareholder wealth to be a function of three unobserved factors: external market discipline, even if it is weak, internal controls and convergence of interests. Moreover, the strength of each factor can be viewed as a function of the level of managerial ownership in the firm. 2 2. 1. Low levels of managerial ownership For low levels of managerial ownership, external discipline and internal controls or incentives will dominate behavior (see Fama, 1980; Hart, 1983; Jensen and Ruback, 1983). Empirically, Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) report results consistent with this behavior for the relationship between managerial holdings and corporate value. However, there is also the possibility that lower levels of ownership within this range have endogenously arisen from performance related compensation packages, such as stock options and stock grants rather than increased ownership in itself leading to higher Q ratios. 2. 2. Intermediate levels of managerial ownership At intermediate levels of managerial ownership, management interests begin to converge with those of shareholders. However, with greater ownership comes greater power in the form of voting rights. Managers may, at this level of holdings, maximise their personal wealth through increasing perquisites and guaranteeing their employment at the expense of corporate value. In addition, while low managerial ownership levels may have arisen through the vesting of compensation plans, it is unlikely that such plans will provide management with a moderate ownership stake in the firm. Moreover, even though external market controls are still in place, these and the effect of convergence of interests are not strong enough to align the behavior of management to shareholders. Managerial labour markets operate on the principal that poorly performing 1 See Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Cho (1998) and Himmelberg et al. (1999) for US companies and Short and Keasey (1999) and Faccio and Lasfer (1999) for UK companies. 2 For example, since compensation packages such as stock options are a transfer of wealth from shareholders to management, their value will lessen as managerial ownership increases. External market discipline is also a function of managerial ownership. Large shareholdings by top management act as a deterrent for takeovers because of the greater ability to oppose a hostile bid or drive up premiums to the point where bidders no longer view the target company as a positive net present value investment Stulz (1988). Finally, internal controls in the form of monitoring from large shareholders and corporate boards should reduce the scope for managers to diverge greatly from the interests of shareholders. Again, however, such discipline is likely to be inversely related to managerial control Denis et al. (1997). 648 J. R. Davies et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (2005) 645–660 anagers can be removed and appropriately disciplined. Studies by Denis et al. (1997) in the US and Dahya et al. (2002) in the UK both find an inverse relation between topmanagement turnover and managerial ownership. This lack of discipline provides evidence of a deficiency in incentives for managers to maximise shareholder value at this level of owners hip. Franks and Mayer (1996) also report that hostile takeover targets in the UK are not poorly performing firms, which is in contrast to the findings of a disciplinary role for corporate takeovers in the US by Martin and McConnell (1991). In this context, Franks and Mayer (1996) provide significant evidence that takeovers in the UK may not act to remove a self-serving board even when they are performing poorly. This lack of disciplinary control over poorly performing management may strengthen management’s ability to pursue sub-optimal corporate policies at intermediate ownership levels. 2. 3. High levels of managerial ownership (less than 50%) As levels of managerial equity ownership grow, objectives converge further to those of shareholders. At ownership levels, below 50% management do not have total control of the firm and external discipline still exists. While perhaps no longer being subject to any major discipline from external takeover markets, it is likely that even at these levels of ownership, managers are still subject to discipline from external block shareholders. This is particularly true in the UK, where because of strong informal ties between institutions (Short and Keasey, 1999), a lax regulatory environment concerning the ownership of listed companies (Roe, 1990) and low monitoring costs (Faccio and Lasfer, 1999), institutional activism is stronger than in the US. This view is also consistent with Franks et al. (2001) contention of strong minority protection laws in the UK, whereby large shareholders cannot transact with related companies without the consent of the firm’s minority shareholders. The UK regulatory framework stands in contrast to US corporate law which limits minorities to seeking redress after the related party transaction has taken place. Combined with monitoring from UK institutions, this may allo w external shareholders to impose some form of control on management even at elatively large levels of managerial ownership. 2. 4. High levels of managerial ownership (greater than 50%) At levels above 50% ownership, management has complete control of the company. Although atomistic shareholders are unlikely to have been able to in influence managers at far lower levels of ownership than this, there is always a possibility that a cartel of blockholders, allied with minority shareholder’s rights under UK company law, may be able to mount a challenge to management if they fail to make decisions in shareholders’ best interests. For a more in-depth discussion of the institutional differences and similarities between the United Kingdom and United States, see Short and Keasey (1999) and Faccio and Lasfer (1999). 3 J. R. Davies et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (2005) 645–660 649 At greater than 50% managerial ownership, this is no longer likely to be a serious issue to management. Furthermore, with majority ownership, the probability of a hostile takeover effectively becomes zero. The failure of external discipline combined with a lack of blockholder incentives above 50% may result in a decrease in corporate value for a small window of managerial holdings above this level. This fall in corporate value is consistent with the theoretical predictions of Stulz (1988). 2. 5. Very high levels of managerial ownership Finally, as managerial shareholdings rise to very high levels, management effectively become sole owners of the company. This would lead to value-maximising behavior as predicted by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Consistent with Morck et al. 1988), Short and Keasey (1999) and Faccio and Lasfer (1999) at above a certain level of ownership, corporate managers are faced with such severe financial penalties for failing to maximise the value of their companies that they are forced to make decisions which will maximise firm value, regardless of how this affects their private benefits of control. 2. 6. Summary Our characterisation of a highly nonlinear relationshi p between managerial equity holdings and corporate value is in contrast to earlier studies (Morck et al. , 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Cho, 1998; Himmelberg et al. 1999)4, which posit fewer turning points in their analysis. There is little theoretical basis on which the individual turning points can be determined, and the findings of Kole (1995) suggest that these will be in influenced by the size of the firms in the sample. However, it is expected that the second local maximum will be in the region of 50% managerial ownership reflecting the stage at which management gain total control of the company. In the next section, the main tests of our hypotheses will be carried out. 3. Empirical results 3. 1. Description of the data We use data on managerial and external block ownership for 1995 from the MacMillan London Stock Exchange Yearbook for 1996 and 1997. The Yearbook provides summary accounting data including a consolidated balance sheet, information on company directors, legal information on the company’s lawyers, auditors and stockbrokers, principle activities, company history, capital and dividend payments, and industrial sector for the McConnell and Servaes (1990) modelled the corporate value–managerial ownership relationship as a quadratic function, which by construction has only one turning point. 650 J. R. Davies et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (2005) 645–660 vast majority of all quoted companies and securities. 5 We restrict our attention to nonfinancial companies only and require that each firm has complete managerial and external ownership data for 1995, which leaves 802 industrial companies in our sample. 6 Data on capital expenditures, to tal assets employed, after tax profits, depreciation, leverage, equity market values, and research and development costs are collected from Datastream. We estimate Tobin’s Q ratio (our proxy for corporate value) using the formula below: Q? MVEQ ? PREF ? DEBT BV ASSETS ? 1? where: MVEQ=the year-end market value of the firm’s common stock; PREF=the yearend book value of the firmTs preference shares (preferred stock); DEBT=the year-end book value of the firmTs total debt; and BV ASSETS=the total assets employed by the firm, which is measured as total assets minus current liabilities. Our measure is consistent with the modified version of the formula as used by Chung and Pruitt (1994) who find that 96. 6% of the variability in the popular Lindenberg and Ross (1981) algorithm of Tobin’s Q is explained by their approximation. Our method also avoids the data availability problems which arise from using the more rigorous algorithms proposed by Lindenberg and Ross (1981) and Lewellen and Badrinath (1997) in order to estimate the replacement cost of assets. We use book values of preferred stock and long-term debt, rather than the market values proposed by Lindenberg and Ross (1981) and Lewellen and Badrinath (1997). In the UK, there is a far less active market for the trading of corporate debt than that which exists in the US, forcing us to rely on book values for these variables. In a final stratification of our sample, we mitigate the problem of potential outliers and trim 25 firms with the largest and smallest Tobin’s Q measure, leaving a final sample of 752 firms. 7 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our sample data. The mean managerial ownership stake of all board members is 13. 02%, which is similar to comparable US studies, but slightly lower than Faccio and Lasfer (1999) who report mean ownership of 16. 7%. Tobin’s Q is slightly higher than that reported for related US work with a mean value of 1. 96. The standard deviation of Tobin’s Q is 1. 21, which is also greater than other studies. However, it is substantially less than the mean of 2. 47 reported by Doukas et al. (2002) and is relatively similar to the mean value of 1. 86 that Short and Keasey (1999) report for their market valuation ratio. 8 The mean blockholder ownership is 37. 34% and is on a par with that reported for US firms by McConnell and Servaes (1990) (32. 4%) and 34. 57% reported by Faccio and Lasfer (1999) for UK firms. The full range of firm sizes is included in the sample with the 5 To establish the reliability of the summary ownership data, we carried out a correlation analysis of a subsample of 422 firms from he original data set of 802 companies (52. 62%) for which we were able to obtain company annual reports. The yearbook data and company accounts data exhibited a correlation of 0. 90, with a pvalue of 0. 00. We also establish the robustness of our data by re-estimating the model using data for 1997. This result is discussed later in this section. 6 Recently listed, merged or acquired firms are not included. 7 This is a larger sample than that used by Morck et al. (1988)—371 firms, Cho (1998)—326 firms and Himmelberg et al. (1999)—maximum 427 firms in any 1 year. Measured as the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity, minus any intangibles. J. R. Davies et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (2005) 645–660 Table 1 Descriptive statistics Variable Management ownership Blockholder ownership Largest stakeholder Capital expenditures Total assets employed After tax profits less depreciation/assets employed Debt/assets employed Market value of equity Research and development Tobin’s Q Mean 13. 02% 37. 34% 18. 82% 21,221 255,642 0. 1425 0. 1411 335 2918 1. 9647 S. D. 18. 06% 23. 57% 21. 64% 75,317 1,583,274 0. 4763 0. 252 1399 44,108 1. 2092 Minimum 0. 00% 0. 00% 0. 00% 7 268 A10. 977 0. 0000 0. 68 0 0. 4502 651 Maximum 79. 90% 100. 00% 100. 00% 1,024,200 37,774,000 3. 4207 4. 8358 26,224 1,198,988 7. 0997 Managerial own ership data measures the total level of holdings held by company management that are greater than 0. 5% of a company’s equity. Blockholder data measures the total level of holdings by outside blockholders that are greater than 3% of a company’s equity. Largest stakeholder is the largest single outside blockholder that holds at least 3% of company’s outstanding equity. Capital expenditures (thousands), total assets employed (thousands), after tax profits, depreciation, leverage, equity market values (millions) and research and development costs (thousands) are collected from Datastream. Tobin’s Q is measured as the ratio of the market value of equity and book values of debt and preferred equity to the book value of assets in the firm minus current liabilities. Shareholdings data is taken from the London Stock Exchange Yearbook for 1996 and 1997. All data are for industrial companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange in 1995. mallest company having an equity market capitalization of o680,000 and the largest company’s equity valued at approximately o26 billion. The mean market capitalization of firms in the sample is o335 million. Table 2 provides the distribution of sample statistics grouped by managerial ownership. A very large proportion of the sample (62%) have managerial ownership levels less than or equal to 10%. However, a larg e fraction of companies (11%) also in the sample had boards Table 2 Breakdown of sample by managerial ownership Manager level Ownership Number of firms 464 87 75 41 34 26 21 4 Blockholder ownership, % 43. 34. 5 34. 4 24. 0 22. 7 13. 0 12. 7 5. 8 Tobin’s Q 1. 952 2. 033 1. 736 2. 109 2. 113 2. 257 1. 933 1. 808 Total assets employed 393,861 44,093 26,186 34,322 35,864 28,190 14,234 10,127 Capital expenditures/ assets employed 0. 106 0. 161 0. 124 0. 117 0. 114 0. 100 0. 099 0. 114 Liquidity 0. 130 0. 129 0. 157 0. 194 0. 194 0. 177 0. 169 0. 239 0VMOb10% 10VMOb20% 20VMOb30% 30VMOb40% 40VMOb50% 50VMOb60% 60VMOb70% 70VMOb100% Managerial ownership (MO) data measures the total level of holdings held by company management that are greater than 0. 5% of a company’s equity. Blockholder ownership measures the total level of holdings by outside blockholders that are greater than 3% of a company’s equity. Capital expenditure (thousands), total assets employed (thousands), after tax profits and equity market values (millions) are collected from Datastream. Liquidity is measured as cashflow divided by total assets employed. Tobin’s Q is measured as the ratio of the market value of equity and book values of debt and preferred equity to the book value of assets in the firm minus current liabilities. Shareholdings data is taken from the London Stock Exchange Yearbook for 1996 and 1997. All data are for industrial companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange in 1995. 652 J. R. Davies et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (2005) 645–660 Table 3 Regression results for Tobin’s Q on managerial ownership Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Adj. R 2 Intercept 1. 85 28. 14 0. 017 MO 0. 12 3. 23 MO2 A0. 013 A3. 08 F MO3 4. 63A10 2. 82 2. 651 A4 MO4 A6. 73A10 A2. 53 A6 MO5 3. 36A10A8 2. 24 The following equation was estimated using data for 752 firms listed on the London Stock Exchange during 1995. Q ? a0 ? a1 MO ? a2 MO2 ? a3 MO3 ? a4 MO4 ? a5 MO5 ? e where Q is Tobin’s Q and MO is managerial ownership. Ownership data is taken from the London Stock Exchange Yearbook and Tobin’s Q is calculated from Datastream. which owned at least 40% of all outstanding equity. As would be expected, outside blockholder ownership decreases with managerial ownership. At managerial ownership levels of 30%, blockholder ownership is slightly less at 24%. It is probable that external discipline, as provided by blockholders, would still be strong at these levels of managerial holdings, particularly where informal coalitions among blockholders are more prominent (Short and Keasey, 1999). At higher levels of managerial holdings, blockholder ownership decreases sharply leading to a collapse in the power of blockholders. Managerial ownership is a decreasing function of company size, which is consistent with Demsetz and Lehn (1985). Although firm sizes in the UK are considerably smaller than US firms, the ratios in Table 2 are similar to summary statistics provided in Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Cho (1998) and Himmelberg et al. (1999). Table 2 also illustrates the nonlinear relationship between Tobin’s Q and managerial holdings. Visual inspection indicates two maximum points in the region of 10% to 20% and 50% to 60%, respectively. The convergence of managerial interests to those of shareholders at very high levels of ownership is not apparent at this stage because of the small number of companies with managerial holdings above 70%. However, the statistics for all other groupings are consistent with our theoretical motivation. 3. 2. Estimation of ownership breakpoints In order to model the Tobin’s Q–managerial ownership (MO) function as having two maximum and two minimum turning points, we specify a quintic function, as follows: Q ? 0 ? a1 MO ? a2 MO2 ? a3 MO3 ? a4 MO4 ? a5 MO5 ? e ? 2? For the nonlinear relationship discussed in Section 2 to be valid, the coefficients in Eq. (2) must have the following signs: a 0N0; a 1N0; a 2b0; a 3N0; a 4b0; a 5N0. The estimated values of the coefficients in Eq. (2) are given in Table 3. 9 The intercept coefficient, which is an estimate of Tobin’s Q i n firms with no managerial holdings, is 1. 85. Each slope coefficient is of the correct sign and statistically significant at the 5% level. Although the It is clear that Tobin’s Q will be in influenced by more than just managerial ownership. However, the objective of this paper is to investigate whether the standard quadratic and cubic specifications used in previous studies are too simplistic. To maintain parsimony, we therefore omit other factors from this specific model. Other relevant factors are incorporated into the analysis in a later table. 9 J. R. Davies et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (2005) 645–660 653 Estimated Relationship between Tobin's Q and Managerial Ownership 2. 40 2. 20 2. 00 1. 80 1. 60 1. 40 1. 20 0 0. 1 0. 2 0. 3 0. 4 0. 5 0. 6 0. 7 0. 8 0. 9 Tobin's Q Insider Ownership Fig. 1. Estimated relationship between Tobin’s Q and Managerial Ownership. Tobin’s Q was modelled as a quintic function of insider ownership using ordinary least squares regression. The estimated regression line is: Q=1. 85+0. 12IOA0. 013OI2+4. 63A10A4IO3A6. 73A10A6IO4+3. 36A10A8IO5. adjusted R 2 is low, it is similar to that found in comparable US studies. The use of this model as a basis to estimate managerial ownership turning points leads to four critical values: 7. 01%, 26. 0%, 51. 4%, 75. 7% and is illustrated in Fig. 1. To establish the robustness of our regression model, the spline approach as applied by Morck et al. (1988), Cho (1998) and Himmelberg et al. (1999) to estimate breakpoints was carried out using our generated turning points. Table 4 presents the coefficients resulting from the piecewise linear regression. Similar to Table 3, each coefficient has the expected sign and all but one variable is statistically significant at the 5% level. The only variable that is not significant, MOover 76% , has the correct sign. The probable cause for the lack of significance is the small number of firms in this managerial ownership grouping. An examination of these results suggests that Tobin’s Q increases in firms for managerial ownership levels up to 7% and then declines to ownership levels of 26%. This is almost identical to the turning points in Morck et al. (1988) and Himmelberg et al. (1999) (5% and 25%, respectively) and is comparable to Cho (1998), who uses breakpoints of 7% and 38%. However, it differs from the UK studies of Short and Keasey (1999) and Faccio and Lasfer (1999) who each reports two turning points of 12. 99% and 41. 99%, and 19. 68% and 54. 12%, respectively. Earlier studies limited the turning points to two but in our extension, it is clear that there are another two turning points at much higher levels of managerial ownership. It also appears that market discipline has an influence on managerial objectives up to the point where the board takes complete control (51%). Tobin’s Q then decreases until ownership levels reach 76%, after which Q increases. Denis and Sarin (1999) argue that cross-sectional studies may be subject to bias, whereby they fail to account for events with potentially large valuation consequences. 10 10 Examples of such events may include receiving a takeover bid, top management turnover, etc. 654 J. R. Davies et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (2005) 645–660 Table 4 Spline regression results for Tobin’s Q on managerial ownership Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Adj. R 2 Intercept 1. 854 28. 38 0. 012 MOup 0. 056 2. 93 to 7% MO7% to 26% MO26% 0. 0187 2. 57 2. 769 to 51% MO51% A0. 053 A1. 99 to 76% MOover 0. 624 1. 12 76% A0. 020 A2. 62 F The following equation was estimated using data for 752 firms listed on the London Stock Exchange during 1995. Q ? a0 ? a1 MOup to 7% ? a2 MO7% to 26% a3 MO26% to 51% ? a4 MO51%to 76% ? a5 MOover 76% ?e where Q is Tobin’s Q and MOup to 7%=managerial ownership if managerial ownership b7%, =7% if managerial ownershipN7%. MO7% to 26%=0 if managerial ownership b7%, =managerial ownership minus 7% if 7%bmanagerial ownershipb26%, =26% if managerial ownershipN26%. MO26% to 51%=0 if managerial ownershipb26%, =managerial ownership m inus 26% if 26%bmanagerial ownershipb51%, =51% if managerial ownershipN51%. MO51% to 76%=0 if managerial ownership b51%, =managerial ownership minus 51% if 51%bmanagerial ownershipb76%, =76% if managerial ownership N26%. MOover 76%=0 if managerial ownershipb76%, =managerial ownership minus 76% if managerial ownershipN76%. Ownership data is taken from the London Stock Exchange Yearbook and Tobin’s Q is calculated from Datastream. As a further test of robustness, we carried out the quintic analysis for managerial ownership and Tobin’s Q for the same sample of available firms in 1997. 11 Again, each coefficient was significant with the correct signs and the turning points from the estimated model were relatively stable at 7. 9%, 26. 5%, 55. 2% and 86. 2%. . 3. Endogeneity of managerial equity ownership, investment and corporate value To analyse the effects of endogeneity in the managerial ownership, investment and corporate value relationship, we follow Cho (1998) and carry out a simultaneous equations analysis using two-stage least squares. Cho (1998) and Himmelberg et al. (1999) showed that once endogeneity was controlled, the perceived impact of managerial ownership on corporate value d isappeared. Moreover, corporate value was found to positively affect levels of managerial ownership. It is possible that if the model specification employed by these studies is wrong, what appears to be a lack of statistical significance in the endogenous variables in the simultaneous equations analysis may actually be due to errors in variables arising from the intermediate regressions. We re-run the two-stage least squares analysis of Cho (1998) using our more complex specification. 12 The control variables in our regression are the same as in Cho (1998). Namely, managerial ownership, investment and corporate value are Some firms fell out of the sample because of mergers, delisting, and being taken over. Cho (1998) also attempts to control for specification error by re-estimating his simultaneous regression analysis using managerial ownership as a linear variable and again finds no relationship between managerial ownership and corporate value. However, if indeed there is a nonlinear relationship between ownership and corporate value, such an approach would fail to capture this. 12 11 J. R. Davies et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (2005) 645–660 655 defined to be endogenously determined by each other as well as some additional relevant exogenous variables. That is: Managerial Ownership ? ? market value of firm0s common equity; corporate value; investment; volatility of earnings; liquidity; industry? Corporate Value ? g? managerial ownership; investment; leverage; asset size; industry; block ownership; largest stakeholder? Investment ? h? managerial ownership; corporate value; volatility of earnings; liquidity; industry? For comparability, we define each of the above vari ables as in Cho (1998). For each company, industry dummy variables are set equal to one for each Financial Times Industry Classification (FTIC) grouping that sample firms lie within, and zero otherwise. In addition to the variables used by Cho (1998), we include blockholder ownership and largest stakeholder in the corporate value regressions to reflect the potential impact of blockholder discipline in the UK and the role of a founding or dominant individual on corporate value. All accounting and market variables are taken at the financial year-end from Datastream. In Table 5, we report results from the simultaneous equations analysis. Taking the managerial ownership regression first, all variables with the exception of investment have coefficients with the expected sign. Managerial ownership is negatively related to the market value of equity, which reflects the fact that wealth constraints and risk-aversion will prevent managers from holding substantial stakes in large firms. Firm level liquidity is shown to be positively related to managerial ownership, which is a stronger result than Cho (1998) who reported no significance for this variable. Importantly, Tobin’s Q is found to be significant and positively related to the level of managerial ownership. This is consistent with Cho (1998) but is opposed to Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), who find the opposite effect. This result suggests that managers tend to hold larger stakes in firms that are successful or have higher corporate value. This may also be indicative of successful managers benefiting from equity-related compensation policies. The investment variable, which has a negative impact on managerial ownership is surprising as theory predicts that firm level investment will be positively related to managerial ownership. Himmelberg et al. (1999) contend that firms with high investment spending will have high managerial ownership to alleviate the monitoring problem caused by discretionary managerial spending. However, Jensen (1986) argued that firms may overinvest as a result of an earnings retention conflict, rather than underinvest as Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) moral hazard theory would predict. When a firm is in this situation, managers may be able to maximise their size-related compensation by overinvesting, but are aware that this may ultimately reduce the value of their shareholdings. Although tentative, this could in part explain the negative relation between investment and ownership. Cho (1998) also finds a negative (but insignificant) coefficient on the investment variable using both capital and research and development expenditures. 56 J. R. Davies et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (2005) 645–660 Table 5 Simultaneous equations analysis of managerial ownership, corporate value and investment Variable MVEQ Tobin’s Q Volatility Liquidity Investment Leverage Asset size Largest stakeholder Blockholder ownership MO MO2 MO3 MO4 MO5 Industry dummies Adj. R 2 F Managerial ownership A1. 8A10 (A3. 74) 0. 127 (4. 63) A1. 0A10A6 (A0. 74) 0. 035 (2. 24) A1. 314 (A2. 67) A5 Corporate value Investment 0. 073 (2. 35) 3. 89A10A6 (A2. 86) 0. 013 (1. 01) Yes 0. 045 8. 014 5. 136 (2. 23) 1. 088 (4. 36) 3. 33A10A8 (1. 17) A0. 20 (A0. 06) A0. 837 (A2. 60) 1. 588 (3. 07) A0. 395 (A2. 22) 0. 037 (1. 64) A0. 001 (A1. 14) 1. 9A10A5 (0. 76) Yes 0. 033 3. 497 A0. 035 (A0. 46) 0. 018 (0. 72) A0. 003 (A0. 92) 1. 72A10A4 (1. 03) A3. 12A10A7 (A1. 07) Yes 0. 009 2. 497 Results from a simultaneous equations analysis of managerial ownership, corporate value and investment for 752 firms, using the two-stage least squares method to estimate the following equations: Managerial Ownership ? f ? market value of firm0s common equity; corporate value; investment; volatility of earnings; liquidity; industry? CorporateValue ? g? anagerial ownership; investment; financial leverage; asset size; industry; block ownership; largest stakeholder? Investment ? h? managerial owner ship; corporate value; volatility of earnings; liquidity; industry? In the above equations, managerial ownership measures the total level of holdings held by company management that are greater than 0. 5% of a company’s equity. Blockholder data measures the total level of holdings by outside blockholders that are greater than 3% of a company’s equity. Largest stakeholder is the largest single outside blockholder that holds at least 3% of company’s outstanding equity. Investment is defined as capital expenditure divided by total assets employed, leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets employed and liquidity is measured as cashflow divided by total assets employed. Capital expenditure, total assets employed, after tax profits, depreciation, leverage, equity market values and profit volatilities are collected from Datastream. Tobin’s Q is measured as the ratio of the market value of equity and book values of debt and preferred equity to the book value of assets in the firm minus current liabilities. Shareholdings data is taken from the London Stock Exchange Yearbook for 1996 and 1997. All data are for industrial companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange in 1995. t-Statistics are in parenthesis. The estimated coefficients from the corporate value regression are given in the second column of Table 5. Corporate value is shown to be positively related to investment and leverage. While the investment coefficient is as expected, the sign of the leverage variable requires more discussion. Morck et al. 1988) find that leverage has a negative but insignificant impact on corporate value and attribute this to the possibility of managers in highly levered firms holding a higher than average level of ownership. However consistent with our results, McConnell and Servaes (1990) report a positive significant coefficient for leverage. Leverage can have various effects on firm value. The notion that high debt levels lead to greater corporate value has been argued by Modigliani and Miller (196 3) with respect J. R. Davies et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (2005) 645–660 57 to valuable tax shields, Ross (1977) and Myers (1977) with respect to a signalling hypothesis and Jensen’s (1986) free cashflow hypothesis. Ultimately, leverage is one way of imposing external discipline on management and if it is effective, will lead to increased corporate value. Alternatively, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) interpret a negative association between leverage and firm value as being due to relative inflation between the current time period and the earlier time period where companies had issued much of their debt. We view the most important result from the corporate value regression as being the significance of the managerial ownership variables. Our results indicate that although managerial ownership levels are determined by corporate value, corporate value itself is determined in part by managerial ownership. This finding is at odds with Cho (1998) and Himmelberg et al. (1999) but consistent with the classical view of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and empirical work by Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990). An interesting result is that blockholder ownership is shown to negatively impact Tobin’s Q. This result is consistent with Faccio and Lasfer (1999, 2000). McConnell and Servaes (1990) suggest that this could be due to a conflict of interests, which results from blockholders being forced into aligning themselves with managers so as not to jeopardize their other dealings with the firm. Alternatively, the negative coefficient may be explained by the strategic alignment hypothesis, which argues that blockholders and managers find it mutually beneficial to cooperate with each other. Finally, such findings may be consistent with the arguments of Burkart et al. 1997) in that too much block ownership will overly constrain management and reduce their ability to take value-maximising investment decisions. The investment regression coefficients presented in column three of Table 5 show a significant positive effect of corporate value on investment and a negative effect of profit volatility on investment. The finding that corporate value has a positive effect on investment is consisten t with the arguments of Cho (1998) that highly valued firms will have large investment opportunities. Also, firms with variable earnings will be reluctant to invest if future income is uncertain. Managerial ownership is found to have no impact on firm level investment. However, this may reflect optimality in that investment policy may be one way in which managers affect value, but not the only means. Ultimately we view our findings of a causal relation between ownership and firm value as being of greater significance than the lack of a relation between ownership and investment. These results are consistent with Cho (1998) but slightly stronger, in that volatility of earnings is significant in our regressions but insignificant in Cho (1998). . Conclusions Debate as to the relationship between corporate value and managerial ownership in the US is still unresolved. Studies such as Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) document a nonlinear relation between these two variables. More recent work by Cho (1998), Himmelberg et al. (1999), and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) shows that when controlling for endogeneity, managerial ownership is determined by corporate value but not vice-versa. 658 J. R. Davies et al. Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (2005) 645–660 We argue that even accepting that corporate value and managerial ownership are endogenously related to each other, misspecification of the managerial holding–corporate value relationship may lead to spurious conclusions concerning the direction of causality. Applying a quintic structure, we present results which suggest that the correct form of this relationship is a double humped curve. This is in contrast to other studies that have assumed a cubic or quadratic specification and by construction only one hump. The second hump or local maximum is attributed to a collapse in external market discipline at or around the point where managers take overall control of their firm. At this point, which is around 50% ownership, the management is not sufficiently akin to owners but have sufficient power to disregard any form of external monitoring or discipline. This has a detrimental affect on corporate value for a short window of managerial holdings. At high levels of managerial ownership, managers are effectively majority owners of their firm leading to a convergence of interests with other outside shareholders. Utilizing the quintic specification for managerial ownership, we show that even when controlling for endogeneity, not only is corporate value a determinant of managerial ownership but managerial ownership is also a determinant of corporate value. This finding is consistent with the classical work of Jensen and Meckling (1976), as well as the early empirical work of Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) who do not control for endogeneity in their analysis of corporate value and managerial ownership. We believe our analysis to have several important contributions to the literature on the relationship between managerial ownership and corporate value. First, our quintic specification extends previous work in this area and successfully captures the complex nonlinear relationship between corporate value and managerial ownership. Second, by analysing a completely different market which is similar in structure to the United States, we strengthen the power and insights gained from earlier comparable US studies. Third, we provide evidence that corporate value, firm level investment and managerial holdings are interdependent with each other. This has implications for the debate on the effectiveness of compensation policies involving stock options for top managers. Moreover, our findings suggest that some levels of managerial ownership may not be beneficial to outside shareholders even when these levels are high. At the very least, this paper has served to add to the debate concerning the importance of managerial ownership on corporate value by providing evidence that even controlling for endogenous effects, managerial ownership and stock compensation schemes do have a significant influence on corporate value. Our research has provided an initial step towards a more accurate characterisation of the corporate value–managerial ownership relationship. While we do not posit that our specification can be applied to every given data set, we argue that previous research may be misspecified where it has failed to fully explore alternative specifications of the managerial ownership–corporate value relationship. Future work in this area may focus on other structural forms, which more effectively reflect the interdependence of managerial ownership and corporate prospects. The nonlinear endogenous impact of blockholders on corporate value and managerial ownership would also provide interesting insights on the external discipline that is faced by firm managers and the impact this has on corporate value. J. R. Davies et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (2005) 645–660 659 Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank John Capstaff, Scott Linn, Andrew Marshall, James Wansley and seminar participants at the Financial Management Association International (2001), European Financial Management Association (2002), Dublin Economics Workshop, the University of Strathclyde and an anonymous referee for their valuable comments on earlier versions of the paper. The normal caveat applies. References Burkart, M. , Gromb, D. , Panunzi, F. , 1997. Large shareholders, monitoring, and the value of the firm. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 693 – 728. Cho, M. H. , 1998. Ownership structure, investment, and the corporate value: an empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 47, 103 – 121. Chung, K. H. , Pruitt, S. W. , 1994. A simple approximation of Tobin’s Q. Financial Management 23, 70 – 74. Dahya, J. , McConnell, J. J. , Travlos, N. G. , 2002. The Cadbury committee, corporate performance and top management turnover. Journal of Finance 57, 461 – 483. Demsetz, H. , Lehn, K. , 1985. The structure of corporate ownership: causes and consequences. Journal of Political Economy 93, 1155 – 1177. Demsetz, H. , Villalonga, B. , 2001. Ownership structure and corporate performance. Journal of Corporate Finance 7, 209 – 233. Denis, D. J. , Sarin, A. , 1999. Ownership and board structures in publicly traded corporations. Journal of Financial Economics 52, 187 – 223. Denis, D. J. , Denis, D. K. , Sarin, A. , 1997. Ownership structure and top executive turnover. Journal of Financial Economics 45, 193 – 221. Doukas, J. A. , McKnight, P. J. , Pantzalis, C. , 2002. Security analysis, agency costs and UK firm characteristics. Working Paper. Faccio, M. , Lasfer, M. A. , 1999. Managerial ownership, board structure and firm value: the UK evidence. Working Paper. Faccio, M. , Lasfer, M. A. , 2000. Do occupational pension funds monitor firms in which they hold large stakes? Journal of Corporate Finance 6, 71 – 110. Fama, E. F. , 1980. Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy 88, 288 – 307. Franks, J. , Mayer, C. , 1996. Hostile takeovers and the correction of management failure. Journal of Financial Economics 40, 163 – 181. Franks, J. , Mayer, C. , Renneboog, L. , 2001. Who disciplines management in poorly performing companies? Journal of Financial Intermediation 10, 209 – 248. Hart, O. D. , 1983. The market mechanism as an incentive scheme. Bell Journal of Economics 14, 366 – 382. Hermalin, B. Weisbach, M. , 1991. The effects of board composition and direct incentives on firm performance. Financial Management 20, 101 – 112. Himmelberg, C. P. , Hubbard, R. G. , Palia, D. , 1999. Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance. Journal of Financial Econ omics 53, 353 – 384. Jensen, M. C. , 1986. Agency costs of free cashflow, corporate finance and takeovers. American Economic Review 76, 323 – 329. Jensen, M. C. , Meckling, W. H. , 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305 – 360. Jensen, M. C. , Ruback, R. S. , 1983. The market for corporate control: the scientific evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 11, 5 – 50. Kole, S. , 1995. Measuring managerial equity ownership: a comparison of sources of ownership data. Journal of Corporate Finance 1, 413 – 435. Lewellen, W. G. , Badrinath, S. G. , 1997. On the measurement of Tobin’s Q. Journal of Financial Economics 44, 77 – 122. 660 J. R. Davies et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (2005) 645–660 Lindenberg, E. , Ross, S. , 1981. Tobin’s Q ratio and the industrial organization. Journal of Business 54, 1 – 33. Martin, K. J. , McConnell, J. J. , 1991. Corporate performance, corporate takeovers, and management turnover. Journal of Finance 46, 671 – 687. McConnell, J. J. , Servaes, H. , 1990. Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value. Journal of Financial Economics 27, 595 – 612. Modigliani, F. , Miller, M. H. , 1963. Corporate income taxes and the cost of capital: a correction. American Economic Review 53, 433 – 443. Morck, R. , Shleifer, A. , Vishny, R. W. , 1988. Management ownership and market valuation: an empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 20, 293 – 315. Myers, S. C. , 1977. Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics 5, 147 – 175. Roe, M. J. , 1990. Political and legal restraints on ownership and control of public companies. Journal of Financial Economics 27, 7 – 42. Ross, S. A. , 1977. The determination of financial structure: the incentive-signalling approach. Bell Journal of Economics 8, 23 – 40. Short, H. , Keasey, K. , 1999. Managerial ownership and the performance of firms: evidence from the UK. Journal of Corporate Finance 5, 79 – 101. Stulz, R. E. , 1988. Managerial control of voting rights: financing policies and the market for corporate control. Journal of Financial Economics 20, 25 – 54.

USS Hornet (CV-12) in World War II

USS Hornet (CV-12) in World War II USS Hornet (CV-12) - Overview: Nation: United States Type: Aircraft Carrier Shipyard: Newport News Shipbuilding Company Laid Down: August 3. 1942 Launched: August 30, 1943 Commissioned: November 29, 1943 Fate: Museum Ship USS Hornet (CV-12) - Specifications: Displacement: 27,100 tons Length: 872 ft. Beam: 147 ft., 6 in. Draft: 28 ft., 5 in. Propulsion: 8 Ãâ€" boilers, 4 Ãâ€" Westinghouse geared steam turbines, 4 Ãâ€" shafts Speed: 33 knots Range: 20,000 nautical miles at 15 knots Complement: 2,600 men USS Hornet (CV-12) - Armament: 4 Ãâ€" twin 5 inch 38 caliber guns4 Ãâ€" single 5 inch 38 caliber guns8 Ãâ€" quadruple 40 mm 56 caliber guns46 Ãâ€" single 20 mm 78 caliber guns Aircraft 90-100 aircraft USS Hornet (CV-12) - Design Construction: Designed in the 1920s and early 1930s, the US Navys Lexington- and Yorktown-class aircraft carriers were built to conform to the restrictions set forth by the Washington Naval Treaty. This pact placed restrictions on the tonnage of different types of warships as well as capped each signatorys overall tonnage. These types of limitations were affirmed through the 1930 London Naval Treaty. As global tensions increased, Japan and Italy left the agreement in 1936. With the collapse of the treaty system, the US Navy began conceiving a design for a new, larger class of aircraft carrier and one which drew from the lessons learned from the Yorktown-class. The resulting design was wider and longer as well as included a deck-edge elevator system. This had been used earlier on USS Wasp. In addition to carrying a larger air group, the new design possessed a greatly increased anti-aircraft armament. Designated the Essex-class, the lead ship, USS Essex (CV-9), was laid down in April 1941. This was followed by several additional carriers including USS Kearsarge (CV-12) which was laid down on August 3, 1942 as World War II raged. Taking shape at Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, the ships name honored the steam sloop USS which defeated CSS Alabama during the Civil War. With the loss of USS Hornet (CV-8) at the Battle of Santa Cruz in October 1942, the name of the new carrier was changed to USS Hornet (CV-12) to honor its predecessor. On August 30, 1943, Hornet slid down the ways with Annie Knox, wife of Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, serving as sponsor. Eager to have the new carrier available for combat operations, the US Navy pushed its completion and the ship was commissioned on November 29 with Captain Miles R. Browning in command. USS Hornet (CV-8) - Early Operations: Departing Norfolk, Hornet proceeded to Bermuda for a shakedown cruise and to commence training. Returning to port, the new carrier then made preparations to depart for the Pacific. Sailing on February 14, 1944, it received orders to join Vice Admiral Marc Mitschers Fast Carrier Task Force at Majuro Atoll. Arriving in the Marshall Islands on March 20, Hornet then moved south to provide support for General Douglas MacArthurs operations along the northern coast of New Guinea. With the completion of this mission, Hornet mounted raids against the Caroline Islands before preparing for the invasion of the Marianas. Reaching the islands on June 11, the carriers aircraft took part in attacks on Tinian and Saipan before turning their attention to Guam and Rota. USS Hornet (CV-8) - Philippine Sea Leyte Gulf: After strikes to the north on Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima, Hornet returned to the Marianas on June 18. The next day, Mitschers carriers prepared to engage the Japanese in the Battle of the Philippine Sea. On June 19, Hornets planes attacked airfields in the Marianas with the goal of eliminating as many land-based aircraft as possible before the Japanese fleet arrived. Successful, American carrier-based aircraft later destroyed several waves of enemy aircraft in what became known as the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. American strikes the next day succeeded in sinking the carrier Hiyo. Operating from Eniwetok, Hornet spent the remainder of the summer mounting raids on the Marianas, Bonins, and Palaus while also attacking Formosa and Okinawa. In October, Hornet provided direct support for the landings on Leyte in the Philippines before becoming embroiled in the Battle of Leyte Gulf. On October 25, the carriers aircraft provided support for elements of Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaids Seventh Fleet when they came under attack off Samar. Striking the Japanese Center Force, the American aircraft hastened its withdrawal. Over the next two months, Hornet remained in the area supporting Allied operations in the Philippines. With the beginning of 1945, the carrier moved to attack Formosa, Indochina, and the Pescadores before conducting photo reconnaissance around Okinawa. Sailing from Ulithi on February 10, Hornet took part in strikes against Tokyo before turning south to support the invasion of Iwo Jima. USS Hornet (CV-8) - Later War: In late March, Hornet moved to provide cover for the invasion of Okinawa on April 1. Six days later, its aircraft aided in defeating Japanese Operation Ten-Go and sinking the battleship Yamato. For the next two months, Hornet alternated between conducting strikes against Japan and providing support for Allied force on Okinawa. Caught in a typhoon on June 4-5, the carrier saw approximately 25 feet of its forward flight deck collapse. Withdrawn from combat, Hornet returned to San Francisco for repairs. Completed on September 13, shortly after the wars end, the carrier returned to service as part of Operation Magic Carpet. Cruising to the Marianas and Hawaii, Hornet helped return American servicemen to the United States. Finishing this duty, it arrived at San Francisco on February 9, 1946 and was decommissioned the following year on January 15. USS Hornet (CV-8) - Later Service Vietnam: Placed in the Pacific Reserve Fleet, Hornet remained inactive until 1951 when it moved to the New York Naval Shipyard for an SCB-27A modernization and conversion into an attack aircraft carrier. Re-commissioned on September 11, 1953, the carrier trained in the Caribbean before departing for the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. Moving east, Hornet aided in the search for survivors from a Cathay Pacific DC-4 which was downed by Chinese aircraft near Hainan. Returning to San Francisco in December 1954, it remained on the West Coast training until assigned to the 7th Fleet in May 1955. Arriving in the Far East, Hornet aided in evacuating anti-communist Vietnamese from the northern part of the country before commencing routine operations off Japan and the Philippines. Steaming to Puget Sound in January 1956, the carrier entered the yard for a SCB-125 modernization which included the installation of an angled flight deck and a hurricane bow. Emerging a year later, Hornet returned to the 7th Fleet and made multiple deployments to the Far East. In January 1956, the carrier was selected for conversion to an anti-submarine warfare support carrier. Returning to Puget Sound that August, Hornet spent four months undergoing alterations for this new role. Resuming operations with the 7th Fleet in 1959, the carrier conducted routine missions in the Far East until the beginning of the Vietnam War in 1965. The next four years saw Hornet make three deployments to the waters off Vietnam in support of operations ashore. During this period, the carrier also became involved in recovery missions for NASA. In 1966, Hornet recovered AS-202, an unmanned Apollo Command Module before being designated the primary recovery ship for Apollo 11 three years later. On July 24, 1969, helicopters from Hornet recovered Apollo 11 and its crew after the first successful moon landing. Brought aboard, Neil Armstrong, Buzz Aldrin, and Michael Collins were housed in a quarantine unit and visited by President Richard M. Nixon. On November 24, Hornet performed a similar mission when it recovered Apollo 12 and its crew near American Samoa. Returning to Long Beach, CA on December 4, the carrier was selected for deactivation the following month. Decommissioned on June 26, 1970, Hornet moved into reserve at Puget Sound. Later brought to Alameda, CA, the ship opened as a museum October 17, 1998. Selected Sources DANFS: USS Hornet (CV-12)USS Hornet MuseumNavSource: USS Hornet (CV-12)

Biography of Diana, Princess of Wales

Biography of Diana, Princess of Wales Princess Diana (born Diana Frances Spencer; July 1, 1961–August 31, 1997) was the consort of Charles, Prince of Wales. She was the mother of Prince William, currently in line for the throne after his father, Dianes former husband, and of Prince Harry. Diana was also known for her charity work and her fashion image. Fast Facts: Diana, Princess of Wales Known For: Diana became a member of the British royal family when she married Charles, Prince of Wales, in 1981.Also Known As: Diana Frances Spencer, Lady Di, Princess DianaBorn: July 1, 1961 in Sandringham, EnglandParents: John Spencer and Frances SpencerDied: August 31, 1997 in Paris, FranceSpouse: Charles, Prince of Wales (m. 1981–1996)Children: Prince William (William Arthur Philip Louis), Prince Harry (Henry Charles Albert David) Early Life Diana Frances Spencer was born on July 1, 1961, in Sandringham, England. Although she was a member of the British aristocracy, she was technically a commoner, not a royal. Dianas father was John Spencer, Viscount Althorp, a personal aide to King George VI and to Queen Elizabeth II. Her mother was the Honourable Frances Shand-Kydd. Dianas parents divorced in 1969. Her mother ran away with a wealthy heir, and her father gained custody of the children. He later married Raine Legge, whose mother was Barbara Cartland, a romance novelist. Childhood and Schooling Diana grew up practically next door to Queen Elizabeth II and her family, at Park House, a mansion next to the Sandringham estate of the royal family. Prince Charles was 12 years older, but Prince Andrew was closer to her age and was a childhood playmate. After Dianas parents divorced, her father gained custody of her and her siblings. Diana was educated at home until she was 9 and was then sent to Riddlesworth Hall and West Heath School. Diana did not get along well with her stepmother, nor did she do well in school, finding an interest instead in ballet and, according to some reports, Prince Charles, whose picture she had on the wall of her room at school. When Diana was 16, she met Prince Charles again. He had dated her older sister Sarah. She made some impression on him, but she was still too young for him to date. After she dropped out of West Heath School at 16, she attended a finishing school in Switzerland, Chateau dOex. She left after a few months. Marriage to Prince Charles After Diana left school, she moved to London and worked as a housekeeper, nanny, and kindergarten teachers aide. She lived in a house purchased by her father and had three roommates. In 1980, Diana and Charles met again when she went to visit her sister, whose husband worked for the queen. They began to date, and six months later Charles proposed. The two were married on July 29, 1981, in a much-watched wedding thats been called the wedding of the century. Diana was the first British citizen to marry the heir to the British throne in almost 300 years. Diana immediately began making public appearances despite her reservations about being in the public eye. One of her first official visits was to the funeral of Princess Grace of Monaco. Diana soon became pregnant, giving birth to Prince William (William Arthur Philip Louis) on June 21, 1982, and then to Prince Harry (Henry Charles Albert David) on September 15, 1984. Early in their marriage, Diana and Charles were seen to be publicly affectionate; by 1986, their time apart and coolness when together were obvious. The 1992 publication of Andrew Mortons biography of Diana revealed the story of Charles long affair with Camilla Parker Bowles and alleged that Diana had made several suicide attempts. In February 1996, Diana announced that she had agreed to a divorce. Divorce and Life After The divorce was finalized on August 28, 1996. Settlement terms reportedly included about $23 million for Diana plus $600,000 per year. She and Charles would both be active in their sons lives. Diana continued to live at Kensington Palace and was permitted to retain the title Princess of Wales. At her divorce, she also gave up most of the charities shed been working with, limiting herself to only a few causes: homelessness, AIDS, leprosy, and cancer. In 1996, Diana became involved in a campaign to ban landmines. She visited several nations in her involvement with the anti-landmine campaign, an activity more political than the norm for the British royal family. In early 1997, Diana was linked romantically with the 42-year-old playboy Dodi Fayed (Emad Mohammed al-Fayed). His father, Mohammed al-Fayed, owned Harrods department store and the Ritz Hotel in Paris, among other properties. Death On August 30, 1997, Diana and Fayed left the Ritz Hotel in Paris, accompanied in a car by a driver and Dodis bodyguard. They were pursued by paparazzi. Just after midnight the car spun out of control in a Paris tunnel and crashed. Fayed and the driver were killed instantly; Diana died later in a hospital despite efforts to save her. The bodyguard survived despite critical injuries. The world quickly reacted. First came horror and shock. Then blame- much of which was directed at the paparazzi who were following the princesss car, and from whom the driver was apparently trying to escape. Later tests showed the driver had been well over the legal alcohol limit, but immediate blame was placed on the photographers and their seemingly incessant quest to capture images of Diana that could be sold to the press. Then came an outpouring of sorrow and grief. The Spencers, Dianas family, established a charitable fund in her name, and within a week $150 million in donations had been raised. Princess Dianas funeral, on September 6, drew worldwide attention. Millions turned out to line the path of the funeral procession. Legacy In many ways, Diana and her life story paralleled much in popular culture. She was married near the beginning of the 1980s, and her fairy-tale wedding, complete with a glass coach and a dress that could not quite fit inside, was in synch with the ostentatious wealth and spending of the 1980s. Her struggles with bulimia and depression shared so publicly in the press, were also typical of the 1980s focus on self-help and self-esteem. That she seemed to have finally begun to transcend many of her problems made her loss seem all the more tragic. The 1980s realization of the AIDS crisis was one in which Diana played a significant part. Her willingness to touch and hug AIDS sufferers, at a time when many in the public wanted to quarantine those with the disease based on irrational and uneducated fears of easy communicability, helped change how AIDS patients were treated. Today, Diana is still remembered as the Peoples Princess, a woman of contradictions who was born into wealth yet seemed to have a common touch; a woman who struggled with her self-image yet was a fashion icon; a woman who sought attention but often stayed at hospitals and other charity sites long after the press had left. Her life has been the subject of numerous books and films, including Diana: Her True Story, Diana: Last Days of a Princess, and Diana, 7 Days. Sources Bumiller, Elisabeth, et al. â€Å"Death of Diana: Times Journalists Recall Night of the Crash.† The New York Times, 31 Aug. 2017.Clayton, Tim, and Phil Craig. Diana: Story of a Princess. Atria Books, 2003.Lyall, Sarah. â€Å"Dianas Legacy: A Reshaped Monarchy, a More Emotional U.K.† The New York Times, 31 Aug. 2017.Morton, Andrew. Diana: Her True Story - in Her Own Words. Michael OMara Books Limited, 2019.